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CAUSE NO. 1257392

THE STATE OF TEXAS

\$ IN THE 337TH DISTRICT COURT

VS. \$ OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

JONATHAN ANTHONY SIROS \$ JANUARY TERM, A. D., 2015

Members of the Jury:

The defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, stands charged by indictment with the offense of capital murder, alleged to have been committed on or about the 19th day of November, 2009, in Harris County, Texas. The defendant has pleaded not guilty.

A person commits the offense of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual.

A person commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally commits murder, as hereinbefore defined, in the course of committing or attempting to commit the offense of retaliation. Retaliation is a felony.

A person commits the offense of retaliation if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service or status of another as a:

- (1) public servant, witness, prospective witness, or informant; or
- (2) person who has reported or who the actor knows intends to report the occurrence of a crime.

"Harm" means anything reasonably regarded as loss, disadvantage, or injury, including harm to another person in whose welfare the person affected is interested.

"Informant" means a person who has communicated information to the government in connection with any governmental function.

"Deadly weapon" means a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.

"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

The definition of intentionally relative to the offense of capital murder is as follows:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

The definitions of intentionally or knowingly relative to the offense of murder are as follow:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

The definitions of intentionally and knowingly relative to the offense of retaliation are as follow:

A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

All persons are parties to an offense who are guilty of acting together in the commission of the offense. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. Mere presence alone will not constitute one a party to an offense.

If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

By the term "conspiracy" as used in these instructions, is meant an agreement between two or more persons with intent, that they, or one or more of them, engage in conduct that would constitute the offense. An agreement constituting a conspiracy may be inferred from acts of the parties.

Before you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of capital murder, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt not only that on the occasion in question the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit the felony offense of retaliation against Enrique Velasquez, as alleged in this charge, but also that the defendant specifically intended to cause the death of Enrique Velasquez, by shooting Enrique Velasquez, with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm; or you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, with the intent to promote or assist in the commission of the offense of retaliation, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed in shooting Enrique Velasquez, if he did, with the intention of thereby killing Enrique Velasquez, or you must find

from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on the occasion in question the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, entered into an agreement with Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed to commit the felony offense of retaliation against Enrique Velasquez, as alleged in this charge, that agreement they did carry out their and pursuant Of. committing said conspiracy, and while in the course conspiracy, Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed intentionally caused the death of Enrique Velasquez by shooting Enrique Velasquez with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, and the murder of Enrique Velasquez was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was an offense that should have been anticipated by the defendant as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, and unless you so find, then you cannot convict the defendant of the offense of capital murder.

Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 19th day of November, 2009, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the retaliation against Enrique Velasquez, intentionally cause the death of Enrique Velasquez by shooting Enrique Velasquez with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 19th day of November, 2009, in Harris County, Texas, Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed, did then and there unlawfully, while in the course of committing or attempting to commit the retaliation

against Enrique Velasquez, intentionally cause the death of Enrique Velasquez by shooting Enrique Velasquez with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, and that the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided or attempted to aid Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed to commit the offense, if he did; or

If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, and Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed entered into an agreement to commit the felony offense of retaliation against Enrique Velasquez, and pursuant to that agreement, if any, they did carry out their conspiracy and that in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 19th day of November, 2009, while in the course of committing such retaliation against Enrique Velasquez, Juan Figueredo and/or Judist Broussard and/or Brian Ware and/or others unnamed intentionally caused the death of Enrique Velasquez by shooting Enrique Velasquez with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, and the murder of Enrique Velasquez was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and was an offense that should have been anticipated by the defendant as a result of carrying out the conspiracy, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict "Not Guilty."

An accomplice, as the term is here used, means anyone connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the offense, and whether or not they were present and participated in the commission of the crime. A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible or by both. Mere presence alone, however, will not constitute one a party to an offense.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he splicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. The term "conduct" means any act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

You are instructed that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission.

The witness, Juan Figueredo, is an accomplice, if an offense was committed, and you cannot convict the defendant upon his testimony unless you further believe that there is other evidence in the case, outside of the testimony of Juan Figueredo tending

to connect the defendant with the offense committed, if you find that an offense was committed, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission, and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him.

A defendant may not be convicted of an offense on the testimony of a person to whom the defendant made a statement against the defendant's interest during a time when the person was imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility as the defendant unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed.

"Correctional facility" means a place designated by law for the confinement of a person arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense. The term includes:

- (A) a municipal or county jail;
- (B) a confinement facility operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice;
- (C) a confinement facility operated under contract with any division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; and
- (D) a community corrections facility operated by a community supervision and corrections department.

Corroboration is not sufficient if the corroboration only shows that the offense was committed.

Now, therefore, if you find that the witness, Matthew Roy, was imprisoned or confined in the same correctional facility and at the same time as the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, and that the defendant made a statement against his interest to Matthew Roy or you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you can not convict the defendant on the testimony of Matthew Roy unless you further find that the testimony of Matthew Roy is corroborated by

proof that tends to connect the defendant to the offense, and such evidence must show more than the fact that an offense was committed, and unless you so find or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict "Not Guilty".

You are further instructed that if there is any evidence before you in this case regarding the defendant's committing an alleged offense or offenses other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider such evidence for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other offense or offenses, if any, and even then you may only consider the same in determining the motive, opportunity, intent or knowledge, if any, in connection with the offense, if any, alleged against him in the indictment and for no other purpose.

Our law provides that a defendant may testify in his own behalf if he elects to do so. This, however, is a right accorded a defendant, and in the event he elects not to testify, that fact cannot be taken as a circumstance against him.

In this case, the defendant has elected not to testify and you are instructed that you cannot and must not refer to or allude to that fact throughout your deliberations or take it into consideration for any purpose whatsoever as a circumstance against him.

You are further instructed that any evidence that any witness has been convicted in any case or cases was admitted before you for the purpose of aiding you, if it does aid you, in passing upon the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his or her testimony, and you will not consider the same for any other purpose.

A Grand Jury indictment is the means whereby a defendant is brought to trial in a felony prosecution. It is not evidence of guilt nor can it be considered by you in passing upon the question of guilt of the defendant. The burden of proof in all criminal cases rests upon the State throughout the trial and never shifts to the defendant.

All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact that he has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evidence at all. The presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence in the case.

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant.

It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution's proof excludes all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt.

In the event you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt after considering all the evidence before you,

and these instructions, you will acquit him and say by your verdict "Not Guilty."

You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but the law you shall receive in these written instructions, and you must be governed thereby.

After you retire to the jury room, you should select one of your members as your Foreman. It is his or her duty to preside at your deliberations, vote with you, and when you have unanimously agreed upon a verdict, to certify to your verdict by using the appropriate form attached hereto and signing the same as Foreman.

During your deliberations in this case, you must not consider, discuss, nor relate any matters not in evidence before you. You should not consider nor mention any personal knowledge or information you may have about any fact or person connected with this case which is not shown by the evidence.

No one has any authority to communicate with you except the officer who has you in charge. After you have retired, you may communicate with this Court in writing through this officer. Any communication relative to the cause must be written, prepared and signed by the Foreman and shall be submitted to the court through this officer. Do not attempt to talk to the officer who has you in charge, or the attorneys, or the Court, or anyone else concerning any questions you may have.

Your sole duty at this time is to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant under the indictment in this cause and

restrict your deliberations solely to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant.

Following the arguments of counsel, you will retire to consider your verdict.

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Leslie Brock Yates, Judge Presiding 337th District Court Harris County, TEXAS

WILED Chris Daniel District Clerk

JUN 0 5 2015

Harris County, Texas

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VERDICT

"We, the Jury, find the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, not guilty.".

Chris Daniel District Clerk 111N 0 5 2015

Foreman of the Jury

(Please Print) Foreman

"We, the Jury, find the defendant, Jonathan Anthony Siros, guilty of capital murder, as charged in the indictment."

Foreman of the Jury

(Please Print) Foreman