Texas Forensic Science Commission

FINAL REPORT ON SELF-DISCLOSURE NO. 24.29; DPS WELSACO (SEIZED DRUGS)

January 31, 2025

Table of Contents

TABLE OF EXHIBITS

I. BACKGROUND

A. History and Mission of the Texas Forensic Science Commission

The Texas Forensic Science Commission (Commission) was created during the 79th Legislative Session in 2005 with the passage of HB-1068. The Act amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to add Article 38.01, which describes the composition and authority of the Commission. During subsequent legislative sessions, the Texas Legislature further amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to clarify and expand the Commission's jurisdictional responsibilities and authority.[1]

The Commission has nine members appointed by the Governor of Texas.[2] Seven of the nine commissioners are scientists or medical doctors and two are attorneys (one prosecutor nominated by the Texas District and County Attorney's Association and one criminal defense attorney nominated by the Texas Criminal Defense Lawyer's Association).[3] The Commission's Presiding Officer is Jeffrey Barnard, MD.

B. Commission Jurisdiction

1. Investigations of Professional Negligence and Professional Misconduct Resulting from Laboratory Self-Disclosures

Texas law requires the Commission to "investigate in a timely manner, any allegation of professional negligence or professional misconduct that would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis conducted by a crime laboratory."[4] The term "forensic analysis" is defined as a medical, chemical, toxicological, ballistic, or other examination or test performed

[1] *See e.g.*, Acts 2013, 83rd Leg. ch. 782 (S.B. 1238) §§ 1-4 (2013); Acts 2015, 84th Leg. ch. 1276 (S.B. 1287) §§ 1-7 (2015), Acts 2023, 88th Leg. ch. 742 (H.B. 3506) §§ 1-2 (2023), Acts 2023, 88th Leg. ch. 1149 (S.B. 0991) § 1 (2023).
[2] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 3.
[3] *Id.*
[4] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4(a)(3)(A).

on physical evidence, including DNA evidence, for the purpose of determining the connection of the evidence to a criminal action.[5]

Crime laboratories must report professional negligence or professional misconduct to the Commission.[6] The statute does not define the terms "professional negligence" and "professional misconduct." The Commission defined those terms in its administrative rules.[7]

> "Professional misconduct" means the forensic analyst or crime laboratory, through a material act or omission, deliberately failed to follow the standard of practice that an ordinary forensic analyst or crime laboratory would have followed, and the deliberate act or omission would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis. An act or omission was deliberate if the forensic analyst or crime laboratory was aware of and consciously disregarded an accepted standard of practice required for a forensic analysis.
>
> "Professional negligence" means the forensic analyst or crime laboratory, through a material act or omission, negligently failed to follow the standard of practice that an ordinary forensic analyst or crime laboratory would have followed, and the negligent act or omission would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis. An act or omission was negligent if the forensic analyst or crime laboratory should have been but was not aware of an accepted standard of practice.

2. Accreditation Jurisdiction

The Commission is charged with accrediting crime laboratories and other entities that conduct forensic analyses of physical evidence.[8] The term "crime laboratory" includes a public or private laboratory or other entity that conducts a forensic analysis subject to article 38.35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.[9]

---

[5] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.35(a)(4).
[6] *Id.* at art. 38.01 § 4(a)(1)-(2) (2019); *See also*, 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.219(c)(5) (2020).
(Pursuant to the Forensic Analyst Licensing Program Code of Professional Responsibility, members of crime laboratory management shall make timely and full disclosure to the Texas Forensic Science Commission of any non-conformance that may rise to the level of professional negligence or professional misconduct).
[7] 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.302 (7) and (8) (2020).
[8] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4-d(b).
[9] *Id.* at art. 38.35(a)(1).

3. Licensing Jurisdiction

Under Texas law, a person may not act or offer to act as a forensic analyst unless the person holds a forensic analyst license issued by the Commission.[10] While accreditation is granted to entities that perform forensic analysis, licensing is a credential obtained by individuals who practice forensic analysis. The Texas forensic licensing program took effect on January 1, 2019.

The law defines the term "forensic analyst" as "a person who on behalf of a crime laboratory [accredited by the Commission] technically reviews or performs a forensic analysis or draws conclusions from or interprets a forensic analysis for a court or crime laboratory."[11]

Pursuant to its licensing authority, the Commission may take disciplinary action against a license holder or applicant for a license on a determination by the Commission that a license holder or applicant for a license committed professional misconduct or violated Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.01 or an administrative rule or other order by the Commission.[12] If the Commission determines a license holder committed professional misconduct or violated an administrative rule or order by the Commission, the Commission may: (1) revoke or suspend the person's license; (2) refuse to renew the person's license; (3) reprimand the license holder; or (4) deny the person a license.[13] The Commission may place on probation a person whose license is suspended.[14] Disciplinary proceedings and the process for appealing a disciplinary action by the Commission are governed by the Judicial Branch Certification Commission.[15]

[10] *Id.* at art. 38.01 § 4-a(b); 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.201(c) (2018).
[11] *Id.* at art. 38.01 § 4-a(a)(2).
[12] *Id.* at art. 38.01 § 4-c; 37 Tex. Admin Code § 651.216(a) (2024).
[13] 37 Tex. Admin Code § 651.216(a)(1)-(4) (2024).
[14] *Id.* at (b).
[15] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4-c(e); 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.216(d) (2024).

4. Jurisdiction Applicable to the Disclosure

The accredited discipline of Seized Drugs is subject to the investigative authority of the Commission.[16] The disclosing crime laboratory, the Texas Department of Public Safety - Weslaco Regional Crime Laboratory ("DPS - Weslaco"), is accredited by the Commission and the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board ("ANAB") under International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") standard 17025: 2017, and falls within the Commission's jurisdiction.[17] The individual who is the subject of the disclosure, Kevin Stahl, is a Seized Drugs Analyst who has been licensed by the Commission since July 1, 2021. Mr. Stahl's license was renewed in 2023 and will expire on June 30, 2025. His license is currently "inactive" because he is no longer employed by a Texas-accredited crime laboratory.

C. Investigative Process

The Commission's administrative rules set forth the process by which it determines whether to accept a self-disclosure for investigation as well as the process used to conduct the investigation.[18] The Commission's rules also describe the process for appealing final investigative reports by the Commission including possible disciplinary actions against a license holder or applicant.[19]

D. Limitations of this Report

The Commission's authority contains important limitations. For example, no finding by the Commission constitutes a comment upon the guilt or innocence of any individual.[20] The Commission's written reports are not admissible in civil or criminal actions.[21] The Commission

[16] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4(a)(3).
[17] *See*, https://fsc.txcourts.gov/AccreditedLabPublic# for a list of accredited laboratories.
[18] 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.304-307 (2019).
[19] 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.401 (2024).
[20] TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.01 § 4(g).
[21] *Id*. at § 11.

does not have the authority to subpoena documents or testimony; information received during any investigation is dependent on the willingness of affected parties to submit relevant documents and respond to questions posed. Information gathered in this report was not subjected to standards for the admission of evidence in a courtroom. For example, no individual testified under oath, was limited by either the Texas or Federal Rules of Evidence (*e.g.*, against the admission of hearsay) or was subject to cross-examination under a judge's supervision.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SELF-DISCLOSURE

On August 9, 2024, DPS-Weslaco reported an incident in its Seized Drugs section where an analyst fabricated a replacement for a Random Number Generator (RNG) Form that must be documented in the case record in all seized drugs cases where the laboratory's standard operating procedure provides for statistical sampling. The self-disclosure reports that the analyst created a new RNG Form after misplacing the original, instead of disclosing the error to his supervisor.

A. Notice and Investigative Decision

On October 22, 2024, staff contacted the analyst requesting a response to the allegations in the self-disclosure. The analyst did not respond. At its October 25, 2024, quarterly meeting, the Commission voted to accept the disclosure for investigation by staff.[22]

B. Staff Investigation

On January 6, 2025, staff interviewed the technical reviewer assigned to the case, the Seized Drugs Team Leader/Technical Point of Contact, and the Seized Drugs Section Supervisor. The findings and recommendations contained in this report are based on the case file, quality incident report, other related materials submitted by the laboratory and the interviews conducted by staff.

[22] *See*, 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.307(d) (2024).

III. COMMISSION OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS

A. Factual Findings

This disclosure involves the sampling and forensic analysis of a large volume of seized drug evidence in the DPS Weslaco regional laboratory. In the United States, seized drug evidence often consists of large submissions; a single case may have hundreds or even thousands of tablets or vape cartridges or packages containing white powder. It is often not feasible to test every item submitted given current resources in forensic laboratories across the country. As an alternative to testing each and every tablet or vape cartridge or brick of white powder, forensic laboratories adopt sampling plans following published consensus standards such as ASTM E2548-16, titled "Standard Guide for Sampling Seized Drugs for Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis."[23] The main purpose of sampling is to answer relevant questions about a population of interest—in this case, the seizure of a large amount of potentially controlled substance—by examining a portion of that population. By developing a sampling strategy and implementing appropriate sampling schemes, forensic laboratories reduce the total number of analytical determinations while still providing factfinders with information they need to make key decisions in criminal cases.[24]

Random sampling may be achieved using various approaches. One common approach incorporates a Random Number Generator (RNG), which, as the name suggests, randomly determines which items to sample based on a sampling plan that identifies the minimum number of items needed to achieve a certain confidence interval. Thus, the RNG program helps to facilitate the "random" component of the sampling plan. According to the DPS Seized Drugs Manual (LAB-

[23] *See generally*, Fact Sheet for ASTM E2548-16. This standard is published on the OSAC Registry of Standards at: https://www.nist.gov/osac/registry. Under a cooperative agreement between ASTM and NIST, members of the public can freely access all ASTM E30 standards related to forensic science; simply search for the specific standard by title, number, or keyword, and click the "ASTM Standards Access" button to view the document on the ASTM Compass website.

[24] *See,* supra n. 23.

SD-30), the appropriate information to include on the RNG Form is the case number, analyst information, total number of items in the exhibit, and the total number of items to be selected.[25] DPS policy requires the RNG documentation to be retained in the case record.[26]

On February 14, 2024, the analyst was assigned a case containing several items of evidence, including items 05-01 and 06-01. According to the bench notes, the analyst opened Item 05-01 on March 7, 2024. Item 05-01 consisted of 400 units to be tested (16 boxes each containing 25 boxes containing a vape and cartridge with golden oil). The analyst opened Item 06-01 on March 11, 2024. Item 06-01 consisted of 275 units submitted for testing (11 boxes each containing 25 boxes containing a vape and cartridge with golden oil).

On July 2, 2024, the analyst used the RNG program to determine the which units to sample for Items 05-01 (consisting of 400 total units) and 06-01 (consisting of 275 total units). Under the laboratory's sampling plan, the total number of units selected to be tested for each Item was 5 (five). Pursuant to the laboratory's procedure, the first five numbers generated by the RNG program for each exhibit would be the five items analyzed. After the analysis and other necessary work was complete, the analyst submitted the case record for technical review.

During the technical review process, the technical reviewer noticed that both the Item 05-01 and the Item 06-01 RNG Forms listed "275" as the total number of units in the exhibit. The technical reviewer examined the case file and determined the correct total number of units for Item 05-01 should have been "400". The technical reviewer brought the issue to the attention of the analyst immediately upon noticing it. During initial discussions with the analyst, the technical reviewer advised the analyst he would have to redo the RNG Form for Item 05-01 showing the correct total number of units (400), which would result in a new identification of items by the RNG

[25] DPS Seized Drugs Manual 4.4(A)(2).
[26] *Id.*

program because it would be accounting for the correct number of total items (400) as opposed to the lower incorrect number (275).

Shortly after this initial discussion, the analyst produced a RNG document for Item 05-01 showing the correct number of units (400). He told the technical reviewer that he had provided the "wrong documentation," explaining that he could not find the original RNG document for Item 05-01 (**Original RNG Form**), generated at the time of analysis. He admitted that because he could not find the Original RNG Form, he "re-generated" a new RNG document (**Exhibit A - RNG Form Submitted for Review**) and manually edited the first five numbers (in the first row of the chart) to correspond to the original five numbers (of previously analyzed items) from the initial Original RNG Form. It appears that in the process of "re-generating" the Original RNG Form, he mistakenly listed the total number of units in Item 05-01 as "275" instead of the correct number, "400."

The technical reviewer brought the case record to the Team Leader/Technical Point of Contact. Together, they noticed that one of the numbers generated by the RNG program on the RNG Form Submitted for Review for Item 05-01 was *larger* than 275, which would have been impossible if the RNG program was actually instructed that 275 was the total number of units in the exhibit.[27] This would tend to indicate that when the analyst first generated the RNG Form for Item 05-01, he correctly assigned the number of total units as 400. When the issue was discovered during technical review, the analyst produced a RNG Form for Item 05-01 showing the correct number of units (400) (**Exhibit B – RNG Form with Correct Number of Units**). The analyst represented that this was the Original RNG Form which he had subsequently found. The first five numbers were the same, but in a different order (42, 83, 204, 76, *354*) than the five numbers

[27] The numbers generated were: 76, *354*, 42, 83, 204.

reflected in the RNG Form Submitted for Review. The laboratory is unable to determine whether the document the analyst asserted was the original was in fact the Original RNG Form, acknowledging that it too could have been manually altered.

The Team Leader/Technical Point of Contact and technical reviewer brought the issue to the attention of the Section Supervisor who in turn reported it to upper management. During discussions with management, the analyst admitted to manually altering the RNG Form Submitted for Review. He claimed he re-generated a new form instead of simply admitting he could not find the Original RNG Form because "he did not want to get in trouble." He maintained the RNG Form he provided after the issue was raised was in fact the Original RNG Form which he had found on his laptop.

During discussions with management, the analyst expressed a desire to resign his position as a Seized Drugs Analyst. He was given time to consider his decision, and he resigned on July 25, 2024, approximately one week later. His forensic analyst license was placed on "inactive" status by Commission staff because he no longer works at an accredited laboratory.

B. Stahl committed professional misconduct when he fabricated a case document to replace a lost or misplaced document.

> "Professional misconduct" means the forensic analyst or crime laboratory, through a material act or omission, deliberately failed to follow the standard of practice that an ordinary forensic analyst or crime laboratory would have followed, and the deliberate act or omission would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis. An act or omission was deliberate if the forensic analyst or crime laboratory was aware of and consciously disregarded an accepted standard of practice required for a forensic analysis.[28]

Stahl committed professional misconduct by intentionally manipulating entries to a RNG Form to hide the fact that he had lost or misplaced the original and submitting the fabricated

[28] 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.302(7) (2020).

document along with the case record for technical review. He presented the document to his technical reviewer knowing that it was not the Original RNG Form. He further committed a violation when he chose not to reveal the mistake of losing or misplacing the Original RNG Form. The laboratory believes he either wanted to avoid doing additional work (*i.e.,* re-sampling, and re-analyzing vape cartridges from Item 05-01), or he wanted to avoid a quality incident, or both. Stahl admitted to manipulating the data on the RNG Form Submitted for Review because "he did not want to get into trouble." Neither DPS nor the Commission found this explanation compelling.

The Commission finds that Stahl deliberately failed to follow the standard of practice that an ordinary forensic analyst would have followed with respect to maintaining accurate case records and refraining from fabricating case documentation, and this deliberate act would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis.[29] In the Seized Drugs discipline, sampling plans are an integral aspect of reporting results to the legal end-user. The trier of fact relies upon the information received from the laboratory regarding forensic analysis (including sampling) to make critical decisions regarding guilt or innocence, as well as the penalty group into which the offense falls.

C. Stahl violated the Texas Administrative Code (Code of Professional Responsibility for Forensic Analysts and Crime Laboratory Management) when he submitted a fabricated document in the case record.

Stahl violated commission rule Texas Administrative Code Section 651.219 (referred to as the Code of Professional Responsibility) by manipulating the RNG Form Submitted for Review, specifically the provision requiring an analyst to make and retain full, contemporaneous, clear, and

[29] The term "would substantially affect the integrity of the results of a forensic analysis" does not necessarily require that a criminal case be impacted, or a report be issued to a customer in error. The term includes acts or omissions that would call into question the integrity of the forensic analysis, the forensic analyst or analysts, or the crime laboratory as a whole regardless of the ultimate outcome in the underlying criminal case. *See* 37 Texas Admin. Code § 651.302(10) (2020).

accurate written records of all examinations and tests conducted and conclusions drawn.[30] Losing a case document is a mistake any analyst could make, but replacing the document with a fabricated form is a distinct and very serious matter. By knowingly submitting a fabricated document to his technical reviewer, the analyst put his credibility and the laboratory's credibility at risk.

After losing the form, Stahl also failed to notify management or quality assurance personnel of this "adverse event" as required by commission rule Texas Administrative Code Section 651.219(b)(16).[31] Furthermore, Stahl failed to present accurate and complete data in reports and written presentations based on good scientific practices and valid methods when he falsified the documentation regarding the sampling of the evidence in violation of commission rule Texas Administrative Code Section 651.219(b)(12).[32]

D. The Role of Quality Assurance in Forensic Laboratories

One important role of quality assurance—including the self-disclosure program administered by the Commission—is to provide transparency to end-users regarding events that may deviate from established procedure. There are numerous legal considerations in federal and state criminal procedure that make the transparent flow of information absolutely critical for just outcomes. Additionally, the process of root cause analysis engaged in by the quality division of accredited laboratories is a critical learning tool for identifying areas for improvement and preventing future mistakes. Because forensic analysis occurs within an adversarial legal system, analysts understandably seek to avoid being involved in quality incidents. It is human nature to want to avoid mistakes. However, the reality is that forensic testing is conducted by humans, and humans sometimes make mistakes. Quality assurance documentation is an important tool for

[30] 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.219(b)(7) (2020).
[31] *Id*. at § 651.219(b)(16) (2020).
[32] *Id*. at § 651.219(b)(12) (2020).

memorializing and resolving issues as they arise. The existence of quality incidents across forensic disciplines is a sign of a healthy and proactive laboratory system, especially where (as in the case of Texas DPS) one can track the efficacy of preventive and corrective action and observe the evolution of a quality system over time.

E. Corrective Actions Taken by the Laboratory

The analyst was immediately removed from casework. All open cases were resealed and transferred back to the evidence section. All cases were removed from the analyst's possession and updated in the Laboratory Information Management System (LIMS). The case that is the subject of this disclosure was re-analyzed by another licensed Seized Drugs Analyst. The Seized Drug Section also performed a review of the 71 cases released by the analyst in the 90 days leading up to this incident. The review was completed August 30, 2024, and no other alteration of documentation was detected. Three cases were amended due to minor errors that did not affect results. The local District Attorney's offices were notified in person and the analysis report released to the submitting agency referenced the quality incident.

The Commission commends DPS for its thorough evaluation and resolution of this matter. In particular, the Commission recognizes the cooperative and forthcoming interviews and responses to all Commission staff follow-up questions by members of the Seized Drugs Section at DPS in Weslaco.

IV. DISCIPLINARY ACTION

On a determination by the Commission that a license holder violated a rule or order of the Commission under Article 38.01, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Commission may: (1) revoke

or suspend the person's license; (2) refuse to renew the person's license; (3) reprimand the license holder; or (4) deny the person a license.[33]

Factors considered in determining the appropriate disciplinary action against a license holder may include: (1) the seriousness of the violation; (2) the prevalence of misconduct by the individual; (3) the person's conduct history, including any investigative history by the Commission; (4) the harm or potential harm to the laboratory or criminal justice system as a whole; (5) attempts to conceal the act by the individual; and (6) any other relevant factors.[34]

The Commission also may decide one or more of the following factors warrants less severe or less restrictive disciplinary action in a particular investigation: (1) candor in addressing the violation, including self-reported and voluntary admissions of the misconduct or violation; (2) acknowledgement of wrongdoing and willingness to cooperate with the Commission; (3) changes made by the individual to ensure compliance and prevent future misconduct; (4) rehabilitative potential; (5) other relevant circumstances reducing the seriousness of the misconduct; or (6) other relevant circumstances lessening responsibility for the misconduct.[35] The license holder has the burden to present evidence regarding any mitigating factor that may apply.[36]

The documents contained in a state crime laboratory's case file are part of the official governmental record. Stahl's decision to deviate from policy and fabricate a case record constitutes a very serious violation. However, there is no showing of prior misconduct by the analyst and the analyst has no disciplinary history with the Commission. After the issue was discovered and he was directly confronted by laboratory management, the analyst admitted to the misconduct.

[33] 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.216(a)(1)-(4) (2024).
[34] *Id*. at § 651.216(c)(1)(A)-(E) (2024).
[35] *Id.* at § 651.216(c)(2)(A)-(F) (2024).
[36] *Id*. at § 651.216(c)(3) (2024).

The analyst declined to be interviewed by the Commission and did not present any mitigating evidence.

Stahl's forensic analyst license expires June 30, 2025, but his license status is "inactive" because he is not currently employed by a Texas-accredited laboratory. Based on the serious nature of the violations involved, the Commission suspends Stahl's forensic analyst license through June 30, 2025 (the current expiration date of his license).[37] Were Stahl to obtain new employment as a forensic analyst or technician at a Texas-accredited laboratory and apply to reactivate or renew his license, the Commission will deny or refuse to renew the license until June 30, 2027, and may impose conditions for licensure at that time as permitted by commission rule.

V. APPEALS PROCESS

Any finding by the Commission that includes disciplinary action against a license holder (revocation, suspension, probation, etc.) may be appealed to the Judicial Branch Certification Commission (JBCC).[38] A written request for a hearing before the JBCC must be received by the Commission or by the JBCC within twenty (20) days after the date the notice of the disciplinary action is received, or the Commission's decision becomes final and is not subject to further review by the JBCC or the Commission.[39]

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Commission is authorized to make recommendations, but due to the isolated nature of the incident that is the subject of this disclosure, the Commission does not have any general recommendations for the forensic community with respect to the findings contained in this report.

[37] The effective date of a suspension is determined by commission rule 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 651.402(c)-(e), which permits final disposition by 1) expiration of a 20-day period after the date the license holder or crime laboratory receives notice of the final investitive report; 2) appeal and final hearing by the Judicial Branch Certification Commission; or 3) by agreement in the form of a stipulation, a settlement agreement, or a consent order.
[38] *Id.* at § 651.402(c) (2024).
[39] *Id.*

EXHIBIT A

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
CRIME LABORATORY

Random Number Generator

LAB-SD-30 Rev.01 (08/2022) p.1 Issued by: SQM

Laboratory Case Number: WES-2401-00347-5-1 Analyst: KS

Total number of units in the exhibit: 275 ← 400? EMS 7/11/24

Number of units to sample: 5

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	76	354	42	83	204	160	243	80	130	64
2	259	117	235	95	27	193	125	5	50	117
3	193	265	217	169	147	49	152	110	197	119
4	236	20	94	255	227	153	185	131	252	127
5	94	36	101	21	265	257	86	71	181	228
6	71	95	82	237	149	103	247	185	211	155
7	126	90	200	105	181	49	163	118	144	25
8	108	25	59	160	79	254	132	120	216	19
9	268	76	100	249	61	23	14	244	54	156
10	224	273	27	87	107	81	65	80	202	184

Original Sheet was Added, This is an incorrect Copy
KS 7/11/24

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
CRIME LABORATORY

Random Number Generator

LAB-SD-30 Rev.01 (06/2022) p.1 Issued by: SQM

Laboratory Case Number: WES-2401-00347-6-1 Analyst: KS

Total number of units in the exhibit: 275
Number of units to sample: 5

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	223	69	134	171	19	47	124	64	21	198
2	211	104	154	175	275	256	167	200	86	67
3	23	31	3	126	107	23	27	155	37	237
4	99	254	213	108	164	178	25	69	259	267
5	116	159	41	189	235	195	53	210	166	7
6	166	54	117	14	13	197	87	76	71	145
7	72	117	188	89	263	173	116	117	233	22
8	108	133	56	67	252	106	233	98	275	264
9	257	160	56	240	169	103	42	151	231	259
10	106	25	32	79	69	77	124	157	114	64

EXHIBIT B

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
CRIME LABORATORY

Random Number Generator

LAB-SD-30 Rev.01 (06/2022) p.1 Issued by: SQM

Laboratory Case Number: WES-2401-347-5-1

Analyst: Kevin Stahl

Total number of units in the exhibit: 400

Number of units to sample: 5

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	42	83	204	76	354	268	298	22	20	286
2	201	168	140	304	307	179	71	52	104	363
3	45	44	369	151	258	298	42	2	222	182
4	73	51	319	208	38	33	320	285	273	132
5	103	231	342	352	65	342	393	178	195	363
6	391	312	105	173	230	237	207	81	63	279
7	259	152	73	22	291	245	251	256	125	189
8	57	66	370	212	181	311	9	121	399	17
9	32	175	370	174	136	13	54	107	336	285
10	28	229	309	269	170	192	91	167	258	63

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
CRIME LABORATORY

Random Number Generator

LAB-SD-30 Rev.01 (06/2022) p.1 Issued by: SQM

KS 7/11/24

Laboratory Case Number: WES-2401-347-5-1

Analyst: Kevin Stahl

Total number of units in the exhibit: 400

Number of units to sample: 5

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	42	83	204	76	354	268	298	22	20	286
2	201	168	140	304	307	179	71	52	104	363
3	45	44	369	151	258	298	42	2	222	182
4	73	51	319	208	38	33	320	285	273	132
5	103	231	342	352	65	342	393	178	195	363
6	391	312	105	173	230	237	207	81	63	279
7	259	152	73	22	291	245	251	256	125	189
8	57	66	370	212	181	311	9	121	399	17
9	32	175	370	174	136	13	54	107	336	285
10	28	229	309	269	170	192	91	167	258	63